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ABSTRACT
I examine the differential effects of similarity in accounting policy disclosures
by firms on investment by active and passive institutional investors. I develop a
novel measure of accounting similarity based on the textual disclosure of firms’
accounting policies from their annual reports. I find that, among firms with less
similar textual descriptions of their accounting policies, investment by active in-
stitutions is higher than that of passive institutional investors. This suggests that
these investors have a real or perceived information advantage in investing in firms
with less comparable accounting. To establish causality, I use a difference-in-
differences approach that relies on the plausibly exogenous introduction of an
accounting rule change, which is likely to decrease accounting similarity, and the
rule’s subsequent reversal. My paper offers novel evidence on an under-explored
relation between the textual properties of accounting disclosures and investor pref-
erences.
x
CHAPTER 1
Introduction
Publicly traded firms in the United States are required to file detailed annual reports, which
are subsequently made available to the public. These annual reports, known as “10-K’s”
from the Securities and Exchange Commission form number of the report, must contain de-
scriptions of the operations of the firm, financial results, and the accounting treatment used
to prepare the financial statements. By accounting treatment, it is meant the set of allowed
accounting rules chosen by the firm to recognize revenues and expenses and to measure
assets and liabilities. Firms discuss these accounting treatments in the section of the 10-K
known as the “Summary of Significant Accounting Policies,” which itself is a subsection of
the “Notes to the Financial Statements” (henceforth “the notes”). The accounting policies
section is typically the first subsection of the notes, which themselves typically are the first
section after the financial statements (balance sheet, income statements, statement of cash
flows, and statement of shareholders’ equity). In this paper I find novel evidence that the
accounting policies section contains significant predictive content for investor behavior.
My focus is on institutional investors–large investors who often trade on behalf of a
large number of individuals. Such institutions make up the vast majority of dollars invested
in public equity markets. Prior empirical studies have assumed that institutional investors
uniformly prefer firms with higher quality accounting (DeFond et al. (2011); Fang, Maffett
and Zhang (2015); Kim et al. (2016)). However, theoretical models predict that investors’
preferences for information from firms depends on the degree of their private information
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(e.g., Easley and O’hara (2004)). In this study, I attempt to determine if investors who
take a more active approach or a more passive approach to selecting stocks prefer firms
that have more or less similar accounting treatments–as measured by textual descriptions
of their accounting policies– to their peer firms.
I first demonstrate that managers’ discretion over implementing accounting rules in-
fluences the degree to which their accounting policies sections are similar to peer firms.
Using this finding, I identify an accounting rule change that reduced managers’ discretion
in recognizing revenue and its subsequent reversal to identify causally the differential im-
pact of accounting policy similarity on the behavior of active and passive investors. To
address my research question, I develop and validate a novel proxy for the textual similar-
ity of firms’ financial statements. And, appealing to the plausibly exogenous nature of the
shock to accounting policy similarity induced by the accounting rules, I provide evidence
that investors who are more likely to trade based on superior private information (“active”
investors) buy more shares of firms with less similar accounting policy descriptions than
investors who are more likely to trade based on public information.
My measure of accounting similarity captures primarily the accounting choices among
firms, which is a measure of how comparable firms are. Commonly cited examples of
choices that can alter comparability are the treatment of inventory (last-in, first-out versus
first-in, first-out), the classification of leases as operating or capital leases, and the more
all-encompassing choice of US Generally Accepted Accounting Principles or International
Financial Reporting Standards. The common thread is that to the extent that accounting
rules allow discretion by managers, different choices by managers may lead to higher or
lower levels of comparability across firms. Below I describe two settings in which the level
of discretion afforded to managers under the accounting rules shifted. These settings will
be useful in establishing a causal link between the textual similarity of accounting policies
descriptions and investor ownership.
Effective as of the end of 1998, accounting standard setters created Statement of Posi-
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tion 97-2 (American Institute of Certified Public Accountants’ Statement of Position 97-
2 (SOP 97-2)), to constrain the discretion of managers in firms that engage in multiple-
element software products and services. These rules governed the recognition of revenue
for the sale of products that were bundled with services for installation, updates, and on-
going customer support. The standard was set in response to perceived aggressive revenue
recognition by software firms. Due to the complex nature of contracts for then new bun-
dled software and services stretching over many periods, managers had significant leeway
to use estimates and assumptions when assigning revenue generated from these sales. As
a result of SOP 97-2 firms that sold products or services with a significant software-based
component were required to adhere to a more uniform set of revenue recognition principles.
However, provisions of this rule were later removed by an accounting standard update in
2009.1 This rule change limited the scope of SOP 97-2 and returned to managers of firms
who sold products and services with a mix of software and non-software components (i.e.,
multiple element arrangements) a high level of discretion. In this paper I argue that both
rule changes represent a plausibly exogenous shock to the textual similarity of firms’ finan-
cial statements, specifically with respect to descriptions of their accounting treatments, and
I examine the differential impact on active and passive institutional investors.
To examine this impact, I must define and construct a measure of textual similarity at
the individual firm-level. To do so, I compare the textual description of firms’ accounting
policies from their annual reports (Form 10-Ks) to the descriptions disclosed by their peer
firms and average these pairwise measures.
Certain large institutional investors trade primarily on widely available public infor-
mation (Bushee and Goodman (2007))–these I label passive investors. I argue that these
investors prefer accounting figures that are more comparable across firms. There are three
reasons that this may hold. The first is that simple accounting-based valuation tools, such
as ratio analysis and comparisons of multiples, are more successful when establishing a
1FASB Accounting Standards Update 2009-13 and 2009-14, effective June 15 2010.
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comparable peer firm is easier (Bhojraj and Lee (2002); Young and Zeng (2015); Lee, Ma
and Wang (2015)). Second, as Bradshaw, Miller and Serafeim (2009) document, analyst
forecasts are more useful in more comparable industries–another reason investors may pre-
fer comparable accounting. Third, A more comparable accounting system makes it harder
for a single manager to hide bad news from investors (Kim et al. (2016)).
In contrast, for active investors–those who trade on perceived comparative informa-
tion advantages–the opposite case may hold. There is theoretical and empirical evidence
that sophisticated investors may prefer firms with a more opaque information environment.
Accounting policy disclosures capture the major accounting choices firms make, which in-
fluence the ability of financial statement users to compare accounting information across
firms at a given point in time and over time for a given firm. Therefore, this opacity may
allow these investors to profit from superior information processing capabilities (Kim and
Verrecchia (1994)) or privately acquired information (Maffett (2012)).
My OLS results are consistent with this intuition. To provide evidence on the direction
of causality, I exploit the accounting rule changes in SOP 97-2 and Financial Account-
ing Standards Board’s Accounting Standards Update 2009-13 (ASU 2009-13) that present
plausibly exogenous opposing shocks to the “Summary of Significant Accounting Policies”
text of a specific, known subset of firms. Using a difference-in-differences (DD) regression
specification, I find that decreased textual similarity causes higher investment by active
investors relative to passive investors, and vice-versa.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Chapter 2 reviews prior literature related
to my work. Chapter 3 describes data sources and presents descriptive statistics. Chapter
4 describes my empirical design, identification strategy, and presents empirical results.
Chapter 5 concludes.
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CHAPTER 2
Literature Review
My work draws on several different and disparate streams of research in economics, fi-
nance, and accounting. Primarily, this paper is related to the literature on institutional in-
vestor preferences and trading behavior. Accounting information plays a role in analyzing
the actions of these economic agents through the accounting system’s effect on informa-
tion asymmetry. Thus, my paper draws on work in the broader information asymmetry
and information choice literature. Secondarily, this paper shares technical considerations
with others in finance and accounting that use textual analysis tools to understand the infor-
mation content of firms’ 10-K’s. Within this area, increasingly researchers are examining
specifically the “Notes to the Financial Statements”. I discuss prior work in each of these
areas.
2.1 Active vs. Passive Institutional Investors
Institutional investors–mutual funds, pensions, endowments, hedge funds, and banks–today
own an aggregate of 80% of publicly traded shares and owing to their central role in the
capital markets, institutions have been a focus of research in finance and accounting for at
least three decades. Research into institutions can generally be classified into two groups–
consequences and preferences. By consequences, I mean the price or volume effects of
institutional investment on target firms’ publicly traded equity. By preferences, I mean the
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types of firms (in terms of size, liquidity, governance, or other features) in which institutions
prefer to invest.
This paper is related to studies of institutional preferences. Studies in this group have
found that institutions prefer stocks with high volatility and low transactions costs (Falken-
stein (1996)) and firms that are larger, more liquid, and have had recently depressed stock
prices (Gompers and Metrick (2001)).
Studies about the capital market consequences of institutional investment provide nec-
essary motivation for studies such as this on institutional preferences. According to theoret-
ical work of Merton (1987), firms are likely to benefit from an increased investor base and
recent surveys of institutional investors by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD (2014)) indicate that this is a primary concern for managers.1 Cor-
roborating this, empirical studies (Lehavy and Sloan (2008)) have documented the benefits
of increased ownership of firms’ shares by institutional investors (e.g. mutual funds, hedge
funds, pensions and endowments). Therefore it is important to understand the drivers of
investment by different types of institutions. 2
Two of the earliest studies to address how features of the financial reporting environ-
ment influence institutional investor ownership are Healy, Hutton and Palepu (1999) and
Bushee and Noe (2000). Both papers focus on disclosure quality as a driver of investor
demand. Both papers also find that institutions invest more in firms with higher quality dis-
closure, as proxied by equity research analysts’ subjective ratings of disclosure. My work
adds to these prior studies by including the similarity of accounting treatment as measured
1In addition to the presence of institutional investors the type of institutions (e.g., long-term or short-
term) can have a profound impact on managers’ incentives. The OECD contend that attracting long-term
institutional investors is an active and worthwhile goal for policymakers because infrastructure investments
may be appealing to large institutions because they tend to take a long-term investment horizon (OECD
(2014)).
2Many of the empirical studies in accounting and finance that have combined to map the preferences of
institutional investors broadly belong to one of two research streams–those that find drivers of institutional
investor demand and those studies that examine the impact of investment by institutions. Real and financial
outcomes that have been previously studied are payout policy (Yaniv Grinstein (2005)), corporate governance
(Chung and Zhang (2011)), operating performance and capital expenditure (Ferreira and Matos (2008)),
transparency surrounding corporate pension plans (Eaton, Nofsinger and Varma (2014)), the public-to-private
takeover premium (Bajo et al. (2013)), and stock return volatility (Bushee and Noe (2000))
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from the text of accounting policy disclosures in the 10-K as another feature of the report-
ing environment that affects investor demand. However, I do not address the economic
impacts of these institutional preferences. My focus is financial reporting attributes as a
driver of institutional ownership rather than the outcomes associated with the latter.3
The view that institutions prefer firms with more comparable accounting is directly sup-
ported by DeFond et al. (2011), who examine the link between cross-border investment and
uniformity of accounting policy in the EU around adoption of IFRS. The authors find that
mandatory IFRS adoption increased ownership by mutual funds of firms outside of their
home countries when adoption in the target country was (a) highly credible; and (b) led
to a large increase in uniformity. DeFond et al. (2011) however, do not find that manda-
tory IFRS adoption increased mutual fund ownership in firms in their home countries. A
potential explanation for this non-result is that an increase in uniformity of accounting stan-
dards associated with IFRS did not make firms’ accounting information significantly more
comparable within countries to alter the investment strategies of institutions. This view
is consistent with the evidence in Yip and Young (2012) and Cascino and Gassen (2015),
which show no strong increase in country comparability around the adoption of IFRS in
EU countries.
Another possible explanation for the non-result of DeFond et al. (2011) is that some
domestic mutual funds enjoy a comparative advantage in information processing among
their home-country firms. Thus, on net these funds would not stand to benefit from any
increase in comparability among the home-country firms.
The central hypothesis of this paper is that the textual disimilarity of accounting policy
disclosures represents an information processing costs for investors such that the relative
percentage of shares held by active institutional investors to passive investors is decreasing
in the degree of textual similarity of the “Summary of Significant Accounting Policies”
3Economic outcomes of institutional ownership have been studied in Lehavy and Sloan (2008),
Yaniv Grinstein (2005)), Chung and Zhang (2011), Ferreira and Matos (2008), Eaton, Nofsinger and Varma
(2014), Bajo et al. (2013), Bushee and Noe (2000), among others. See Section ?? for a discussion of this
literature.
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section of the 10-K.
2.2 Information Asymmetry and Investor Demand Liter-
ature
Inofrmation asymmetry is a primary driver of the price of firms’ equity. Analytical models
in the economics and finance literatures that have shown how this can be include Grossman
and Stiglitz (1980), Hellwig (1980), Admati (1985), Wang (1993), and Easley and O’hara
(2004). In Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) the presence of “noise traders”–that is investors
who do not trade on factors related to the firm’s stock but on factors instead related to their
own needs for liquidity–provide a necessary source of information asymmetry for investors
to earn returns to any investing strategy.4 Hellwig (1980) shows how information asymme-
try can persist in a capital market with a large number of traders and that the importance of
any piece of information to any trader depends on her prior preferences. One of the findings
of Admati (1985) is that investors reaction to information depends on their own prior pri-
vate information and that differences in these priors (i.e., information asymmetry) can lead
to different posterior beliefs and therefore different trading behavior. Wang (1993) provides
more specific claims for how information asymmetry can impact stock prices, specifically
through its impacts on price volatility and autocorrelation in returns.
The prior papers show the effects of information asymmetry but do not address the
source of information asymmetry. Easley and O’hara (2004) shows both how information
asymmetry can affect the cost of capital for a firm and provides a role for the accounting
system in determining the level of information asymmetry in the market. In their model, the
quality and quantity of public information in the market affects stock prices. When firms
release more and better information to the public it increases the precision of the beliefs
4In the language of economic decision theory, the noise trader approach prevents rational expectations
equilibria from being fully revealing.
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of uninformed investors, thereby lowering the risks to these investors. Easley and O’hara
(2004) point out that standard asset pricing models would not capture this result because the
accounting treatments do not have an effect on the firm’s underlying operations or earnings.
My work here looks at a very specific mechanism for how accounting choices that do not
change the underlying economics of the firm can influence investor behavior.
2.3 Relation to the Literature on Accounting Comparabil-
ity
Financial statement analysis textbooks (seeHealy and Palepu (2007); Koller, Goedhart and
Wessels (2005)) generally advise users of financial statements to begin an accounting-based
comparison of peer firms by noting discrepancies in the calculations and assumptions used
to generate balance sheet and income statement numbers. This is because the extent to
which the accounting numbers of two firms can be compared and how likely their future
perfomance is to covary depend on the accounting choices used to map economic reality to
reported numbers.
As required by US GAAP, firms discuss the details of these calculations and assump-
tions in their annual reports. Therefore, an indirect proxy for accounting comparability can
be constructed from the “Summary of Significant Accounting Policies” from firms’ annual
report, the standard location of these disclosures. These disclosures are nested within the
“Notes to the Financial Statements” section, after the audited financial statements.
I extract the “Summary of Significant Accounting Policies” section from the financial
statements computationally. I then use a document similarity algorithm to compare the text
in this section of each firm reporting in a given fiscal year to each other firm in that fiscal
year. I explain in more detail the exact procedure in a subsequent section. In short, each
selection of text is viewed as a collection of word “tokens” and the frequency of each token
in each document is counted. Two documents are then compared based on the number of
9
words they have in common and how often they contain each of those words. The result is
that documents that contain many of the same words will have a high similarity score and
two selections of text that have do not share many words will have a very low similarity
score.5
I use the accounting policy descriptions to measure accounting similarity because they
directly address the firm’s treatment of economic transactions in the financial statements.
By comparing these disclosures to peer firms, the measure attempts to capture differences
in accounting that are not due to merely differences in firm structure. In regression analyses
firm-specific, time-varying control variables help to further address this concern.
Financial reports are a mix of quantitative figures (net income, assets, cash flows etc.)
and textual disclosures, which are intended to help financial statement consumers under-
stand the process by which the figures were generated. These disclosures cover many as-
pects of firms’ operational environment and potential future risks, the Summary of Signifi-
cant Accounting Policies section of the notes to the financial statements directly addresses
the assumptions and procedures used to map the firm’s economic reality to its accounting
figures. While many different accounting treatments may lead a firm to calculate net in-
come as $100, the more the firm discloses about the underlying process the better investors
will be able to assess performance and assign value. Analyzing accounting treatments tex-
tually in this way is a noisy, but feasible method for determining how similarly earnings
(and other accounting figures) are computed across otherwise similar firms.
Accounting treatments are a function of firms’ business environments (economic real-
ity), the accounting rules, and the managerial discretion allowed under the accounting rules.
I attempt to hold the first two inputs constant and appeal to plausibly exogenous variation
in the latter input to establish a causal link between accounting and investor behavior.
One potential economic interpretation of the information captured by the textual sim-
5One of the first papers in finance and accounting to use this approach to compare firms’ disclosures was
Hoberg, Phillips and Prabhala (2014), which compared the product discreptions from the “Item 1. Business”
sections across firms’ annual reports.
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ilarity of accounting policy disclosures is that of accounting “comparability.” Such an
input-based measure of accounting comparability differs from the output-based methods of
Bhojraj and Lee (2002) and De Franco, Kothari and Verdi (2011), who use a regression-
based approach to estimate mappings from returns to earnings for a focal firm and apply
these to a target firm. Comparability in these studies is measured as the accuracy of these
projected earnings. Similar methods have been used in recent work to link accounting
comparability to peer earnings restatements (Campbell and Yeung (2016)), the valuation of
seasoned equity offerings (Shane, Smith and Zhang (2014)), and expected crash risk (Kim
et al. (2016)). I add to this growing literature by proposing a measure of comparability
less sensitive to the estimation problems of these measures. Specifically, my measure of
comparability does not require more than two years of financial reports, nor does it rely on
a statistical relations between earnings and returns that are likely to be very weak. A draw-
back to using the textual similarity of accounting disclosures is that it is difficult, if not
impossible, to disentangle comparability measured in this manner from underlying com-
plexity of the firm. Of necessity, future empirical studies that address directly accounting
or financial statement comparability must make use of multiple empirical proxies.
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CHAPTER 3
Data Sources, Variable Definitions, and
Descriptive Statistics
3.1 Firm-Level Accounting and Institutional Investment
Data
I make use of several common sources of data in my empirical analyses. Company ac-
counting data are from Compustat, stock price and returns data are from CRSP, and analyst
forecast and coverage data from IBES. Investors with over $100 million in qualifying as-
sets are required to report recent investment holdings to the SEC via Form 13-F. Data on
institutional holdings are from Thomson-Reuters’ 13-F database. My data span all stocks
listed on the NYSE, NASDAQ, or American Stock Exchange (AMEX) and all industries
over the years 1994 to 2015. I define institutional ownership for each firm in each year
as the ratio of shares held by institutions to the total shares outstanding. My final sample
consists of 41,159 firm-year observations. Table B.1 contains summary statistics of the
institutional investor holdings for 1980-2015, raw and unclassified in terms of active or
passive investors for comparisons with prior studies. Over the entire time period for which
data are available, institutional investors held over 41% of shares in firms.1
Table B.1 also shows a decomposition of institutional ownership percentage by market
1In recent years, this number is approximately 80%.
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value of equity. For comparison, I present statistics for the sample used in this study along-
side the time period considered in Yaniv Grinstein (2005)’s study on institutional holdings
and payout policy. Their study only covers the period up to 1996 and has very different
selection process based on the data needs for their analysis, yet the patterns of institutional
ownership by market capitalization are qualitatively similar.
My classification for active and passive investors is derived from the institutional in-
vestor classification data provided by Brian Bushee2. These classifications in turn are
derived from and improvements on Thomson Reuters’ classification scheme. Figure B.1
shows the time series of institutional ownership percentage. In the figure, the institutions
are disaggregated by type. Type 1 institutions are bank trusts; type 2 are insurance com-
panies; type 3 are investment companies; type 4 are independent investment advisors; type
5 includes corporate pension funds, public pension funds, university endowments, founda-
tion endowments, and miscellaneous large institutions. From the figure, it is clear that large
institutions hold the majority of publicly traded shares and this relationship has been stable
over time.
I classify active investors as investment companies, independent investment advisors,
corporate (private) pension funds, public pension funds, and university and foundation en-
dowments. I classify passive investors as banks and insurance companies. My classification
of active investors is intended to capture the segment of institutions that have significant hu-
man and intellectual capital to devote to analyzing financial statements. Active institutions
deploy teams of researchers, buy external research and data on target firms, and may en-
gage directly with firms’ managers and investor relations department. Passive institutional
investors trade primarily based on the past history of earnings, returns, and financial ratios
of firms, which are cheaply available. Passive investors hold a larger number of stocks in
more diversified portfolios. They spend much less time analyzing each individual financial
statement. To the extent that I can successfully distinguish between these two classes of in-
2http://acct.wharton.upenn.edu/faculty/bushee/IIclass.html
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vesors, I can test empirically the predictions of asymmetric asset pricing models that claim
investor demand is linked to the degree of private information by investors.
My primary outcome variable is the ratio of dollars held by active investors to that of
passive investors, which I label PCT -ACTIV E. My secondary outcome variable is the
ratio of the number of active investors to passive investors, NUM -ACTIV E. The bottom
panel of Table B.2 contains summary statistics for these variables, which indicate that the
majority of firms (a 95% confidence interval) have a share of active-to-passive investment,
herein defined, between 60% and 100%. Figure B.2 shows the time series of these ratios
of institutional investment. Both outcome variables have trended upwards over time. By
construction, as active institutional investment has become the majority of institutional
investment, the gap between dollars and number of investors has closed.
3.2 Accounting Similarity Measurement
Common practice among readers of financial statements is to compare accounting treat-
ments between a target firm and it’s peer firms. Since this information on accounting
treatments is disclosed in the “Summary of Significant Accounting Policies” section of
the annual report, this is where I measure accounting similarity. I use what is known in the
natural language processing area as a “bag-of-words” approach to analyzing these sections
of text. I assume that if two firms use very different words to describe their accounting
policies then their accounting policies are very different. Using a bag-of-words approach
I can create a vector representation of the words in each document (i.e. each accounting
policies section I extract). This vector representation of document words makes the em-
pirical analysis of textual similarity more tractable. However, this approach loses semantic
and morphological content.
To measure the similarity of accounting policy disclosures, I programatically retrieve
all 10-K filings from the Securities and Exchange Commission’s EDGAR database of com-
14
pany filings. I extract the “Summary of Significant Accounting Policies” section of the
footnotes using textual analysis algorithms I implement in the Python programming lan-
guage. Details on the mathematical basis for the construction of the measure are given
in a subsequent section. For each firm I compute the similarity of its accounting policy
disclosures to that of firms in the same industry (2-digit Standard Industrial Classification,
or SIC, code) in the same year.3 I then average the similarity score for each firm-year and
denote this value as SIM .
My similarity measure is a cosine similarity measure of the changes in words firms use
to describe their significant accounting policies in the footnotes to their annual reports. I
compare these disclosures to that of peer firms. My presumption is that these disclosures
from managers represent a meaningful source of information, which investors can use to
compare numerical accounting figures across firms. This is in-keeping with the original
Accounting Principles Board pronouncement around such information:
Applying generally accepted accounting principles requires that judgment be exercised as to
the relative appropriateness of acceptable alternative principles and methods of application in
specific circumstances of diverse and complex economic activities. ...
The accounting policies of a reporting entity are the specific accounting principles and the
methods of applying those principles that are judged by the management of the entity to be
the most appropriate in the circumstances to present fairly financial position, cash flows, and
results of operations in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles and that,
accordingly, have been adopted for preparing the financial statements.
The accounting policies adopted by a reporting entity can affect significantly the presentation
of its financial position, cash flows, and results of operations. Accordingly, the usefulness
of financial statements for purposes of making economic decisions about the reporting
entity depends significantly upon the user’s understanding of the accounting policies fol-
lowed by the entity.
3The SIC system was created in 1937 by the US government to classify firms into industry. There have
been alternate measures proposed by regulators and researchers in economics, finance, and accounting. The
SIC system itself is deprecated among US Federal statistical agencies in favor of the North American Industry
Classification System, or NAICS. However, the SIC system is the current system favored by the SEC.
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(APB 22, emphasis added)
The construction of textual similarity, SIM , between two sets of accounting policy
disclosures involves three components. First, denote the set of all words occurring in the
“Summary of Significant Accounting Policies” descriptions in a year is Ωt. We measure
a scalar, Jt ≡ ||Ωt||, that is, the number of unique words used in the descriptions of both
firms. For each firm i in year t, an ordered binary vector Wit is constructed such that each
element W (j)it of Wit is one if and only if word j occurs in the given firm’s text in the given
year. Let Nit ≡ Wit/||Wit||, the normalized vector of word occurrences for each firm-year.
For each year, construct a similar vector Ut of size Jt in which each element U
(j)
t is equal
to the sum of the number of occurrences of each word j among both sets of text. From this
vector, compute a measure of the aggregate change in text from year t − 1 to year t as the
change in the number of times the word was used. Denote this aggregate word use change
variable as Dt−1,t.
Formally,
Dt−1,t ≡
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∑
j
(Uj,t − Uj,t−1)
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣. (3.1)
The textual similarity of a firm’s accounting policy disclosures in a year is constructed
as
SIMit ≡ Wit||Wit|| ·
Dit
||Dit|| , (3.2)
which is the cosine of the angle between the firms’ vectors of word occurrences and the
aggregate word change vector.
In subsequent analysis I make use of a measure of a firm’s self similarity,
SELF -SIMit ≡ 1− Wit||Wit|| ·
Wit
||Wit|| , (3.3)
which attempt to measure the degree to which the firm is changing its description of its
own accounting policies from one year to the next. By construction, the similarity measure
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is on the closed interval from zero to one.
3.2.1 Preprocessing
To more accurately analyze the 10-K sections I perform several preprocessing steps on the
corpus. Specifically, I remove alphanumeric sequences and punctuation, convert all words
to lowercase, and perform stemming and lemmatization on each document. Stemming
and lemmatization are methods from the fields of computational linguistics and natural
language processing that are designed to normalize textual corpora for automated analyses.
Stemming requires to conversion of a word token to its root, removing pluralization and
conjugation. Lemmatization is designed to convert word tokens that are different but often
used to refer to the same physical entity to a common token.
Below is an example from the 2011 annual report of IBM. The filing originally con-
tained the line:
Additionally, changes to noncontrolling interests in the Consolidated State-
ment of Changes in Equity were $(29) million, $8 million and $(1) million for
the years ended December 31, 2011, 2010 and 2009, respectively The accounts
of variable interest entities (VIEs) are included in the Consolidated Financial
Statements, if required.
After the pre-processing steps described above, the line became:
addit chang noncontrol interest consolid statement chang equiti million mil-
lion million year end decemb respect account variabl interest entiti vie includ
consolid financi statement requir
To reduce further the amount of irrelevant information contained in each piece of text
extracted from the 10-K, I weight each word token that occurs via a method known as
term frequency-inverse document frequency (tf-idf). This weighting scheme reduces the
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influence of overly common terms in a text corpus on the analysis of that corpus. These
steps should reduce the amount of noise in the construction of accounting similarity.
3.3 Empirical Validation of Textual Similarity Measure
Since this measure of textual similarity of accounting policy disclosures is new, I explore
the measure’s empirical properties and relation with common constructs in accounting and
finance.
The graphs below show the time series and cross-sectional distributions of both peer-
firm textual similarity, SIM , and own-firm textual similarity, SELF − SIM . The latter
measure is the similarity of the text in the “Summary of Significant Accounting Policies”
section for a given firm and itself one year prior. As expected, own-firm textual similarity
tracks that of SIM for each firm, but is almost always higher.
The bottom panel of Table B.2 contains summary statistics for my similarity measure.
For SIM , the mean is lower than the median, indicating the presence of a few observations
with very low textual similarity.
The percentile values of SIM indicate sufficient variation, but by themselves lack a
clear interpretation. Therefore I perform a univariate regression with SIM as the depen-
dent variable and each of my subsequent control variables. This provides an empirical
explanation of the sources of variation in textual similarity. Reported in Table B.3, I find
that SIM is negatively associated with measures that largely capture firm complexity–
age, size, and payout and leverage structure. Textual similarity is positively associated
with asset tangibility and liquidity and is not statistically associated with capital market
related factors. In multivariate analyses (TableB.4) I find that SIM is positively and sta-
tistically significantly associated at at least the 10% level with size, turnover, buy-and-hold
returns over the period, and firm age. It is negatively associated with stock price, Tobin’s
q, earnings, inclusion in the S&P 500, analyst following, and forward price-to-earnings ra-
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tio. Own-firm similarity (SELF -SIM ) is positively associated with stock price, Tobin’s
q, leverage, and assets. It is negatively associated with size, turnover, returns, firm age, and
inclusion in the S&P 500. In general these associations move in the opposite direction to
that of peer-firm textual accounting policy disclosures’ similariy (SIM ).
One possible interepration of these associations is related to the life cycle of the firm.
That is, firms in more mature and stable stages of their operations (as opposed to new firms
in more dynamic product markets) have more similar accounting treatments to their peers.
This use of more similar accounting treatment could be the result of firms and their peers
converging on accounting practices over time.
As a further validation, I examin the predictive power of SIM for properties of firms’
earnings. I preform OLS regressions of several measures of contemporaneous and fu-
ture earnings. In the equation below ACCOUNTING is one of the following dependent
variables: SIM : (peer-firm) accounting similarity or SELF -SIM : own-firm accounting
similarity over prior year. EARNINGS is one of ROAit: contemporaneous net income
scaled by assets, ROAit+1: future net income scaled by assets, NEG EARNINGSit+1:
an indicator equal to one if future net income is negative, or DEC EARNINGSit+1: an
indicator equal to one if next period’s net income is less than the current year.
EARNINGSit+1 = β0 + β1ACCOUNTINGit + β2TANGit + β3MVEit
+ β4AGEit + β5SP500it + β6DIVit + β7LEV ERAGEit
+ β8Qit + β9RETURNit + β10ASSETSit
+ β11EARNINGSit + Y eart + εit+1.
(3.4)
In Equation 3.4, Y ear captures year fixed-effects. These fixed-effects control for un-
observed time-specific factors that may influence the relationship between earnings perfor-
mance and similarity. All other variables are as defined in Section 3.4. The other variables
control for numerous potentially confounding observable factors identified by prior studies.
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I also include the lagged value of the dependent variables to adjust for the autocorrelation.
Overall, the full regression results with control variables are mixed. Table B.5 reports
that accounting similarity is positively and statistically associated with contemporaneous
earnings (ROA). SIM is negatively, but not statistically significantly associated with fu-
ture earnings. However, SIM is weakly related to future bad performance–negative earn-
ings and earnings decreases.
3.4 Control Variables
For each observation I control for a variety of factors that may confound the relationship be-
tween active investor ownership and textual similarity of accounting policies, SIM . Prior
studies have shown that certain firm characteristics may be associated with institutional
investor demand. These characteristics are liquidity demands of institutions Falkenstein
(1996); Ferreira and Matos (2008); Huang (2015), preferences by institutions for larger
companies (Gompers and Metrick (2001)) and dividend payers (Yaniv Grinstein (2005)),
and the age and leverage of constituent firms (Badrinath, Kale and Ryan (1996)).
The control variables I include are the number of years the firm appears in Compustat
(AGE), the ratio of monthly trading volume to number of shares outstanding (TURNOVER),
the stock return over the preceding year (RETURN), the average daily stock price over the
preceding year (PRICE), the natural logarithm of the book value of assets (ASSETS), the
natural logarithm of market capitalization (MVE), the average bid-ask spread (BASPREAD),
an indicator variable for whether or not the firm is in the S&P 500 (SP500), the dividend
yield (DIV), the ratio of the book value of total debt to assets (LEVERAGE), Tobin’s q (Q),
calculated as in Chung and Pruitt (1994), return on assets (ROA)–the ratio of net income
to the book value of total assets, and the level of asset tangibility (TANG), calculated as in
Almeida and Campello (2007).
I include the number of equity research analysts who provide earnings forecasts for the
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firm (NANALYSTS), as a proxy for the quality of the information environment of the firm.
Table B.2 shows summary statistics for these variables. These variables are very similar
to those in Chung and Zhang (2011), who use a similar set of control variables. Finally,
I include the forward price-to-earnings ratio (PE)–computed as the current period stock
price divided by the one-year-ahead analyst consensus earnings forecast–as a measure of
investors’ performance expectations for the firm.
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CHAPTER 4
Empirical Results
4.1 Baseline Ordinary Least Squares Results
For each firm in each fiscal year in my sample, I compute the similarity between that firm’s
“Summary of Significant Accounting Policies” section and that of all other firms in its
industry (2-digit SIC). I then take the median over all industry peers as that firm’s level of
similarity. My dependent variable is the ratio of active-to-passive investors for each firm
as of that firm’s fiscal year-end date. In all subsequent regressions I lag my variable of
interest, SIM , and all control variables. I also rank SIM for each firm into deciles by
year.
4.1.1 Regression of Levels of Active-to-Passive Ownership Ratio
To assess how textual similarity of accounting disclosures affects the ratio of active to
passive institutional investor ownership, in Table B.7 I report ordinary least squares (OLS)
results of estimating variants of the following regression pooled over each firm i and year
t:
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PCT -ACTIV Eit+1 = β0 + β1COMPit + β2TANGit + β3MVEit + β4PRICEit
+ β5TURNOV ERit + β6AGEit + β7BASPREADit
+ β8SP500it + β9DIVit + β10LEV ERAGEit + β11Qit
+ β12RETURNit + β13ROAit + β14ASSETSit
+ β15NANALY STS + Y eart + Firmi + εit.
(4.1)
In Equation 4.1, Y ear and Firm capture year and firm fixed-effects, respectively.
These fixed-effects control for unobserved time-specific and firm-specific factors that may
influence the relationship between active ownership and similarity. All other variables are
as defined in Section 3.4. The other variables control for numerous potentially confound-
ing observable factors identified by prior studies. Since the expected impact of firm-level
factors, especially similarity, is likely to take at least a year, I examine the effect of all vari-
ables on the one-year-ahead ratio of active-to-passive investor ownership. I also include the
lagged value of PCT -ACTIV E to adjust for the autocorrelation in the dependent variable.
Lastly, I repeat the estimation by replacing PCT -ACTIV E with NUM -ACTIV E–the
ratio of the number of active institutional investors to passive institutional investors–as the
dependent variable.
I start with a simple model that regresses the one-year-ahead active-to-passive investor
ownership ratio only on my main variable of interest, SIM and year and firm fixed-effects
(I cluster standard errors at the firm level). The regression is estimated for 32,940 firm-year
observations. I find that the coefficient estimate is -0.005, suggesting a negative (positive)
relation between active (passive) investor ownership and comparability. I then add the time-
varying control variables. The coefficient estimate of SIM is still negative and significant
at the 1% level, indicating that the negative relation between accounting similarity and ac-
tive institutional ownership holds even after controlling for a large variety of other possible
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drivers of institutional ownership. This relationship is also economically meaningful: an
increase in similarity from the first to the ninth decile is associated, ceteris paribus, with a
decrease in institutional ownership by around 7%.
Columns (3) and (4) of Table B.7 report the regression results from estimating Equa-
tion 4.1 with the dependent variable replaced by NUM -ACTIV E. I observe a very sim-
ilar pattern for the coefficient estimates of SIM in both the baseline regression and the
specification that includes time-varying controls.
4.1.2 Regression of Changes in Active-to-Passive Ownership Ratio
Since many econometric time series are smooth, regression analyses using levels can gen-
erate spurious regressions, an effect which can be mitigated by a changes specification of
the regression(Granger and Newbold (1974)). Table B.8 reports results of a regression with
change in the active-to-passive institutional ownership ratio and change in similarity as the
dependent and independent variables, respectively, along with changes in the control vari-
ables. The R2’s for these models are lower, but in all cases, for all types of institutions the
coefficient on SIM is negative and statistically significant.
There are two major potential sources of endogeneity that hinder my ability to claim that
increased textual similarity of accounting disclosures causes higher institution ownership.
The first is reverse causality–that is, higher institutional ownership causes firms to alter
their behavior in ways that increase their similarity. The second threat to causal inference
is an omitted variable that is correlated with both my measure of accounting similarity and
institutional ownership, which would lead to biased and inconsistent coefficient estimates.
To mitigate the impact of this form of endogeneity I employ a thorough set of theoretically
and empirically motivated control variables. These variables control for other observable
factors that may influence institutional ownership. Additionally, in untabulated analyses, I
switch my dependent variable PCT -ACTIV E and variable of interest SIM . Regressing
one-year-ahead similarity on PCT -ACTIV E and control variables, I find no statistically
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significant relation between the two. This somewhat alleviates concerns that active investor
ownership causes changes in similarity.
4.2 Identification
My analysis of the differential effect of the textual similarity of accounting policy dis-
closures on active and passive institutional investment utilizes a quasi-natural experiment
involving accounting rule changes that limited and increased managerial discretion. My
assumption, which I validate, is that managerial discretion is a primary driver of the ac-
counting treatments disclosed in the “Summary of Significant Accounting Policies” section
of the 10-K.
The first event, the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants’ (AICPA’s)
Statement of Position 97-2 (SOP 97-2), adopted in Srivastava (2014), relies on the rule’s
aim to decrease the level of discretion for managers in recognizing revenue associated with
certain software-containing products and services. Unlike its role in Srivastava (2014),
which was as a shock to the contracting role of earnings, reduced discretion over revenue
recognition in my setting serves as a source of exogenous variation in accounting treatment,
which should affect institutional investor ownership in a firm only through its effect on sim-
ilarity. The second event is the subsequent partial reversal of the provisions in SOP 97-2.
The requirements in SOP 97-2 were subsequently relaxed in the FASB’s ASU 2009-13.
This allows me to estimate a treatment reversal effect in the spirit of Leary (2009).
The outcome of these rules was a respective increase then decrease in similarity in
the treatment sample. The questions then are whether there is an increase (decrease) in
similarity around the SOP 97-2 (ASU 2009-13) event window and whether this increase
(decrease) is associated with an economically significant effect on the ratio of active-to-
passive institutional investor ownership. I use a difference-in-differences (DD) analysis to
estimate these effects. As ASU 2009-13 was only a partial reversal of the limited discretion
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given to managers under SOP 97-2, I expect my results in this test to be somewhat weaker
in magnitude. In the next section I provide further institutional details of these accounting
rule changes and how they are useful for my research question.
4.3 Two Quasi-Natural Experiments: SOP 97-2 and ASU
2009-13
The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants’ (AICPA’s) Statement of Position
97-2 (SOP 97-2) reduced the amount of discretion managers of affected firms had with
respect to one aspect of revenue recognition. SOP 97-2 was put forth to curtail revenue
recognition practices that were perceived to be overly aggressive. Specifically, firms that
sold software were able to shift revenue across reporting periods. This is because software-
based products began to shift from a good to more of a service. Software updates and
support were bundled into the initial price but would be delivered over future months and,
increasingly, years. This growing mismatch of revenues and expenses could allow firms
to prematurely allocate a portion of the selling price to revenue. SOP 97-2 required a
strict precedent, known as vendor specific objective evidence (VSOE), for recognizing rev-
enue from these multiple element arrangements. The fair-value-like requirement of VSOE
meant that firms needed a long history of standalone pricing for each element in a multi-
element arrangement (Stuart (2008)). Without this evidence, firms would have to delay the
recognition of all revenues until all services have been delivered.
Over time, as more products began to incorporate software components, the range of
products and services covered by SOP 97-2 grew beyond that initially intended by standard
setters. Subsequently, FASB introduced an updated standard to reduce the scope of SOP 97-
2. Known as Accounting Standards Update (ASU) 2009-13, this rule limited SOP 97-2 to
pure software transactions and allowed managers to make use of estimates when allocating
the price of longer term contracts to deliver bundled software services.
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The limited discretion allowed under SOP 97-2 may have increased the similarity of
accounting treatments of these firms financial statements to each other by forcing similar
economic transactions to appear similar.1 I view this case as likely and prior research has
documented a pervasive pattern of increased discretion given to managers (e.g., Dechow
and Skinner (2000), Beneish (2001), Hribar and Jenkins (2004), Beatty, Ke and Petroni
(2002), Ayers, Jiang and Yeung (2006)) leading to lower quality financial statements. Em-
pirically, this is the association I document between similarity and the introduction of SOP
97-2.2 At the same time, this rule increased the potential gains to superior private informa-
tion of firms. Investors with the ability or an endowment of more precise information as to
the nature of the underlying transactions would thus benefit.
Through similar reasoning, the reversal of parts of SOP 97-2 by ASU 2009-13 allows
me to identify the effect of decreasing textual similarity of accounting disclosures on the
ratio of active-to-passive institutional investor ownership.
4.3.1 Difference-in-Differences Design
My Difference-in-Differences methodology requires that I specify a representative event
window around the accounting rule change events. The trade-off when selecting this event
window is that an overly wide window will confound the effects of the rule changes with
1It is possible the comparability of reported income statement numbers decreased by forcing dissimilar
economic transactions to appear similar. For my setting it is only necessary that companies appear to have
more similar accounting, which would generate a disincentive for investors to exert effort collecting and
analyzing information. A simple example illustrates this point. Consider two firms, Firm 1 and Firm 2, that
have agreed to provide $100 in service over the next four years. Firm 1 will provide an equal value of the
service over each period (i.e. $25 in each year). Firm 2 will provide $25 worth of service in year 1 and
$75 worth in year 4. SOP 97-2 would require both firms to recognize $0 in revenue for the first three years
and $100 in the fourth. In the presence of the accounting rule, managers would be barred from using their
judgment in deciding when to recognize each amount of revenue. These transactions, with markedly different
underlying economics, would appear similar. However, managers have extensive leeway to widely disclose
non-GAAP figures in such cases. They have much less incentive and leeway to discuss these effects in the
Significant Accounting Policies section of the 10-K, which is the focal point at which I measure similarity.
2Anectdotally, Boeing has recently come under scrutiny for its atypical accounting for large upfront in-
vestments in developing airplanes and the extensive use of estimates in allocating the costs of the planes
(Ostrower (2016)). The accounting rules permit this level of discretion by Boeing’s managers, but other man-
ufacturers in the same industry allocate the majority of the cost upfront. This is a typical real world example
of the mechanism by which I view more discretion as leading to lower similarity.
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other economic events, while a window that is too narrow may not capture the effects of
interest. I define the pre-period as years 1995 to 1997, as the effective date for SOP 97-2
was fiscal-years ending after December 31, 1997. I use years 1998 to 2001 as the post-
period for treated firms. To the extent that firms did not adjust financial reports in line with
the new standard in a timely manner, this classification of the post-period will bias against
finding results. ASU 2009-13 was promulgated concurrently with Accounting Standards
Update 2009-14 (ASU 2009-14), which also relaxed revenue recognition criteria for firms
engaged in non-software multi-element contracts. It is not necessary for my analysis to sep-
arate firms affected by the two standards since both serve to increase (decrease) managerial
discretion (similarity). Both rules were effective after 2010. Therefore my pre-period for
ASU 2009-13 are the years 2008 and 2009; the post-period are the years 2011 to 2013.
Next, I assign firms into treatment and control groups based on industry (Standard In-
dustrial Classification (SIC) codes). SOP 97-2 primarily applied to firms that engaged in
bundled hardware and software products with services for installation, upgrades, and cus-
tomer support. Following Srivastava (2014) I classify treated firms as those in the following
industries based on three-digit SIC codes: household audio, video equipment, and audio
receiving (365); communication equipment (366); electronic components and semicon-
ductors (367); computer hardware (368); telephone communications (481); or computer
programming, software, and data processing (737). This classification is not perfect. There
are likely to be firms for which the rules in SOP 97-2 do not apply and firms outside of this
classification for which they do. To the extent that these two types of misclassification are
random and not systematically related to my outcome variables, this will induce noise but
not bias in my estimation sample.
ASU 2009-13 was adopted by firms in the same industries as those affected by SOP 97-
2 except pure software firms. Therefore I exclude these industries from the classification of
treated firms (SIC codes 7375 and 7379).3
3From the SIC Code Manual this includes: “Establishments primarily engaged in providing on-line infor-
mation retrieval services on a contract or fee basis. The information generally involves a range of subjects
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The identification challenge is to account for the fact that both accounting treatments
and active-to-passive institutional investment in firms may vary from one year to the next.
In other words, one needs to account for the fact there may be natural changes from year-to-
year in the independent and dependent variables. The difference-in-differences approach
divides the sample of firms into treatment and control groups. In the context of my paper,
the treatment groups include all firms that were affected by SOP 97-2 and, separately, all
firms affected by ASU 2009-13. The control group includes firms not affected by these rule
changes. Formally the DD can be estimated via regressions of the form:
PCT -ACTIV E = β0 + β1TREATED × POST + β2TREATED
+ β3POST + γ
′X+ ε.
(4.2)
Above, X is a vector of time-varying firm-level control variables. The DD analysis,
by comparing the temporal changes in effects for the treatment and control groups, allows
for both group-specific and time-specific effects. The DD estimator is unbiased under the
condition that the rule changes are not systematically related to other factors that affect
the control group. I estimate Equation 4.2 for PCT -ACTIV E and NUM -ACTIV E and
with ASU 2009-13 treatment firms and matched firms.
A potential concern with the above estimator is the possibility that the treatment and
control firms may be meaningfully and systematically different from each other. In this
case, the partial effect may be confounded by also capturing the differences in the charac-
teristics of the different groups. For instance it may be the case the firms with good future
prospects (as proxied by Tobins q or the forward price-to-earnings ratio) engage in more
complex activities that make their accounting less comparable to peer firms. I will want to
keep the pre-event firm characteristics of my treatment sample similar to those of my con-
and is taken from other primary sources. Establishments primarily engaged in performing activities, such
as credit reporting, direct mail advertising, stock quotation services, etc., and who also create data bases are
classified according to their primary activity. Establishments primarily engaged in collecting data bases from
primary sources and reformatting or editing them for distribution through information retrieval services are
classified in Industry 7379.”
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trol sample. To account for such potential systematic differences across the two samples, I
use a statistical matching technique on observed firm characteristics.
After identifying relevant treatment and control firms, I match control firms to treatment
on several key variables prior to estimation. I match candidate control firms based on
propensity scores using the pre-selected independent variables (age, assets, bid-ask spread,
buy-and-hold return, dividend yield, leverage, market value of equity, analyst following,
forward price-to-earnings, stock price, Tobins q, return on assets, an S&P 500 indicator,
and stock turnover). My approach ensures that the changes in ownership are caused only by
the plausibly exogenous change in accounting similarity by making treatment and control
firms similar ex ante except for the application of SOP 97-2 and ASU 2009-13.
In Table B.10 I report the univariate comparisons between treatment and control firms’
characteristics in the pre-event years. The univariate comparisons indicate that no system-
atic significant differences exist in the matching variables. This suggests that the matching
process has successfully removed significant observable differences between treatment and
control groups before the events. To the extent that this is not the case, changes in owner-
ship may be due to causes other than the shock to similarity.
I perform two diagnostic tests to ensure the validity of the parallel trends assumptions
between treatment and control, which is necessary for a DD estimation. First, I examine
the difference in the ratio of active-to-passive institutional investor ownership between the
treatment and control groups over a six-year event window surrounding the accounting
rule changes. Figure B.5 shows the difference between the treatment and control groups is
stable in the three years leading up to the shocks, suggesting that there are no pre-trends
present for ownership. This graphical inspection gives confidence that the parallel trends
assumption for DD is not violated.
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4.3.2 Difference-in-Differences Estimation Results
I first check the DD estimator for accounting similarity to verify the premise of the quasi-
natural experiments: plausibly exogenous shocks to similarity due to accounting rules SOP
97-2 and ASU 2009-13 should lead to an increase and a decrease in similarity, respectively,
for the treatment group relative to the control. Table B.9 reports the results of this analysis.
Columns (1) and (2) report the DD estimation around the SOP 97-2 rule change event.
The third and fourth columns of Table B.9 report results around the ASU 2009-13 event.
Consistent with my conjecture, I observe a relative increase in similarity by around 6.9%
after SOP 97-2, a relative decrease in similarity by around 4.97% after ASU 2009-13. For
context, the average value of my measure of accounting similarity in the sample is 36.4%
and the effect of SOP 97-2 (ASU 2009-13) would be to move the median firm from to the
8th (2nd) decile. The pre-trend graphs in Figure B.4 lends support to the validity of this
initial difference-in-differences analysis.
This finding can be thought of as, essentially, the first stage of my estimation. The
effect is economically meaningful and statistically significant in the direction expected. I
will incorporate this number in subsequent analyses of the economic impact of accounting
similarity.
I next look at how the ratio of active-to-passive institutional investor ownership changes
for the treatment sample across the rule changes. Increases in this ratio implies that in-
vestment by active (passive) institutions is higher (lower). These results are present in
Table B.11. The first column includes the DD analysis without the control variables,
Column (2) includes these controls, and Columns (3) and (4) repeat the analysis with
NUM -ACTIV E.
First, I discuss the SOP 97-2 treatment event results. The average change in the active-
to-passive ownership ratio for treatment firms is -7%, and that for control firms is -3.59%.
The DD estimator for PCT -ACTIV E is -4% and significant at the 5% level. In terms of
economic significance, my analysis suggests that an exogenous 6.9% increase in similarity
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causes the share of active institutional investment to decrease by about -4% compared to a
similar firm without a change in its level of similarity to its peers. The average change in
the number of active-to-passive owners for treatment firms is -5.58%, and that for control
firms is -0.58%. The DD estimator for NUM -ACTIV E is -5% and significant at the 1%
level. This suggests that an exogenous 6.9% increase in similarity causes the share of active
institutional investors to decrease by about -5%.
Next, I discuss the results around the ASU 2009-13 treatment event, which partially
reversed the limited discretion given to managers under SOP 97-2 for treated firms. The
average change in the active-to-passive ownership ratio for treatment firms is 2.77%, and
that for control firms is 0.89%. The DD estimator for PCT -ACTIV E is 1.88% and sig-
nificant at the 1% level. In terms of economic significance, my analysis suggests that an
exogenous 4.97% decrease in accounting similarity causes the share of active institutional
investment to increase by about 1.88% compared to a similar firm without a change in the
level of textual similarity of accounting policy disclosures to its peers. The average change
in the number of active-to-passive owners for treatment firms is much smaller at 0.58% and
significant only at the 10% level.
4.4 Alternative Explanations and Mechanisms
There are two plausible explanations for my results, which I attempt to rule out. The first
is that managers alter their tendency to manage earnings in a way that correlates with the
behavior of investors. I perform a separate difference-in-differences analysis to explore this
potential effect. I use as a proxy for earnings management the tendency of managers to just
meet or beat consensus analyst forecasts. I define the meet/just beat threshold as realized
earnings figures that are with zero to three cents of the median one-year-ahead analyst
forecast (see Beatty, Ke and Petroni (2002) and Ayers, Jiang and Yeung (2006)). It is
unclear ex ante if the earnings management behavior of firms changes, what the differential
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response of active investors with respect to passive investors would be. Nevertheless, the
results in Table B.13 show no strong evidence that earnings management increases around
either the SOP 97-2 or the ASU 2009-13 treatment events. This is consistent with the
results of Srivastava (2014).
The second alternative explanation is that managers’ alter their voluntary disclosure be-
havior in response to changes in the similarity or complexity of their financial statements–
possibly resulting from shocks to the level of discretion allowed by the accounting rules.
However, to the extent that managers increase voluntary disclosure when accounting sim-
ilarity decreases, this will bias against my results. The evidence in Table B.14 show now
clear evidence of management increases in voluntary disclosure around either the SOP 97-2
or the ASU 2009-13 treatment events.
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CHAPTER 5
Conclusion
In this paper, I examine the differential effect of the textual similarity of accounting policy
disclosures on active versus passive institutional investor ownership. I find that firms with
accounting policy disclosure that are more similar to their peers have lower (higher) active
(passive) investor ownership. To establish causality, I use a difference-in-differences esti-
mation with treatment events that represent shocks to managerial discretion. I show that
increases (decreases) in managerial discretion allowed by accounting rules cause decreases
(increases) in the similarity of accounting treatments within an industry. My identification
tests suggest a causal effect of the textual similarity of accounting policy disclosures on the
active-to-passive investor ownership ratio. The evidence is consistent with the hypothesis
that active investors prefer to invest in marginally more difficult to understand firms, as
that lets them exploit a real or perceived comparative informational advantage. Overall,
my study offers novel evidence of a previously under-explored impact of a high degree of
uniformity of accounting treatments (as proxied by firms’ disclosures), namely, that it may
not be preferred by certain classes of investors.
Another contribution of this paper is the development of a measure of the similarity of
accounting treatments among peer firms. I assume that firms with more similar accounting
treatments will have more similar disclosure of their accounting policies. Because firms are
required to disclose their accounting policies in a section of their annual reports known as
the “Summary of Significant Accounting Policies,” I compute for each firm the similarity
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of this section of textual disclosure to its industry peers. I provide novel evidence that
these disclosures are associated with future firm performance. Importantly, I discover that
my measure of textual similarity of firms’ accounting policy disclosures is associated with
poor future performance. Though not central to my research question, this finding supports
prior research that has found that more opaque or difficult to understand firms are more
likely to face significant negative performance shocks in the future (e.g. Kim et al. (2016)).
A primary driver of the similarity of disclosure about accounting treatments is the no-
tion of accounting comparability. However, comparability is only one desirable trait of
accounting numbers, along with relevance and reliability (FASB (2010)). It is possible
that, overall, comparability may be in conflict with one or both of these other goals. If so,
investors may rationally choose to invest in groups of firms with less comparable account-
ing than they would in absence of the tradeoffs with relevance or reliability. This would
make it harder to uncover an empirical association between investor preferences and ac-
counting comparability. A limitation of this study is that I do not examine the relationship
between my proxy for comparability and relevance/reliability. This is a potential avenue
for future work.
Throughout, I have claimed that active investors may prefer firms with less similar
disclosure because it either 1) enables them to exploit their comparative advantage in pro-
cessing complex information, or 2) they merely perceive they have such a comparative
advantage. It is interesting follow-up question which of these two cases holds. Future
work may link institutional investors’ performance with the disclosure attributes of their
portfolio firms. It may be the case that funds that invest in firms with lower accounting
quality or more idiosyncratic accounting treatments generate higher returns, lower returns,
or in equilibrium, due to competitive pressures in the market for shares, see no effect on
performance. Linking a dimension of accounting quality to the performance of investors
may address the social welfare implications of the properties of financial statements.
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APPENDIX A
Variable Definitions
Variable Definition
PCT -ACTIV E The ratio of shares held by “active” institutions to that of
“passive” institutions.
NUM -ACTIV E The ratio of the number of“active” institutions to that of
“passive” institutions.
TREATED Indicator variable for difference-in-differences analyses
AGE The number of years the firm appears in Compustat.
TURNOV ER The ratio of monthly trading volume to number of shares
outstanding.
RETURN The stock return over the preceeding year.
PRICE The average daily stock price over the preceeding year.
ASSETS The natural logarithm of the book value of assets.
MVE The natural logarithm of market capitalization.
BASPREAD The average bid-ask spread.
DIV The dividend yield .
LEV ERAGE The ratio of the book value of total debt to assets.
Q Tobin’s q, calculated as in Chung and Pruitt (1994).
ROA Return on assets: the ratio of net income to the book value
of total assets.
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TANG The level of asset tangibility, calculated as in Almeida and
Campello (2007).
NANALY STS The natural logarithm of the number of analysts following
the firm.
PE The forward price-to-earnings ratio, computed as the cur-
rent price divided by the 1-year-ahead consensus analyst
forecast for the firm.
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APPENDIX B
Tables and Figures
Figure B.1: The ratio of institutional investor ownership in US common stocks, over time,
disaggregated by institution type. Type 1: banks trusts. Type 2: insurance companies. Type 3:
investment companies. Type 4: independent investment advisors. Type 5: corporate pension funds,
public pension funds, university endowments, foundation endowments, and miscellaneous.
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Figure B.2: The ratio of active-to-passive institutional investor ownership in US common stocks,
over time.
39
Figure B.3: (Top panel) Time series trends of accounting comparability measure SIM . (Bottom
panel) Pooled cross-sectional distribution of SIM .
40
Figure B.4: Trends of textual accounting disclosure similarity in the treatment sample net of
control sample.
Panel A shows the trend surrounding the SOP 97-2 event window. Panel B shows the trend
surrounding the ASU 2009-13 event window.
41
Figure B.5: Trends of active-to-passive institutional investor ownership in the treatment
sample net of control sample. Panel A shows the trend surrounding the SOP 97-2 event window.
Panel B shows the trend surrounding the ASU 2009-13 event window.
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Table B.1: Instutional Ownership by Market Value of Equity
This table reports information on aggregate institutional holdings across different firm size (market value
of equity) groups. Data span all stocks listed on the NYSE, NASDAQ, or American Stock Exchange
(AMEX) and all industries over the years 1980 to 2015. Institutional ownership, IO, for each firm in
each year as the ratio of shares held by institutions to the total shares outstanding. All variables are
aggregated at the industry (two-digit SIC) level. December fiscal-year-end firms. 1980-1996 included
for comparison to Yaniv Grinstein (2005).
Full Sample 1980 - 1996 Sample
Market Cap
Quintile
Mean Market
Cap ($M) Obs
Mean
Institutional
Holdings (%)
Mean Market
Cap ($M) Obs
Mean
Institutional
Holdings (%)
1 3.5 6,146 17.17 2.6 2,364 14.64
2 12.2 6,159 30.40 8.9 2,371 24.87
3 36.3 6,160 44.89 27.3 2,374 34.41
4 113.2 6,159 53.95 88.7 2,371 42.70
5 1,343.1 6,151 58.66 689.5 2,368 49.75
All 3,014.8 30,775 41.02 163.3 11,848 33.28
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Table B.3: Univariate Determinants of Accounting Comparability
This table presents univariate regression results of SIM on firm characteristics. SIMt−1 indicates the
one-year lag of similarity. All other variables are as defined in Appendix A.
Coefficient Std Error t R2
AGE 0.0001 0.0001 2.0500 0.0200
AT 0.0029 0.0005 6.0800 0.1600
BASPREAD -0.3274 0.0514 -6.3700 0.1700
BHR 0.0005 0.0013 0.3700 0.0000
DIV -0.0002 0.0002 -0.8900 0.0000
LEVERAGE -0.0069 0.0046 -1.4900 0.0100
MVE 0.0030 0.0005 6.3800 0.1700
NANALYSTS -0.0001 0.0001 -0.8300 0.0000
PE -0.0000 0.0000 -2.4000 0.0200
PRICE 0.0000 0.0000 0.8900 0.0000
Q -0.0008 0.0006 -1.4300 0.0100
ROA -0.0083 0.0056 -1.4900 0.0100
SP500 -0.0131 0.0024 -5.5100 0.1300
TANG -0.0092 0.0050 -1.8500 0.0100
TURNOVER 0.0012 0.0001 10.4800 0.4600
SIMt−1 0.6492 0.0058 111.7300 38.3300
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Table B.4: Determinants of the Textual Similarity of Accounting Policy Disclo-
sures
Regression of the textual similarity of accounting policy disclosures from the “Summary of Signifi-
cant Accounting Policies” section, SIM , from firms’ 10-K’s and control variables. SELF -SIM is
the year-to-year similarity in a firm’s own accounting policies text. All other variables are defined in
Appendix A.
Dependent variable:
SIM SELF -SIM
Constant 0.1815∗∗∗ 3.2230∗∗∗
(0.0065) (0.5006)
SIMt−1 0.6449∗∗∗
(0.0059)
SELF -SIMt−1 0.6320∗∗∗
(0.0061)
MVE 0.0039∗∗ −0.0046∗
(0.0018) (0.0027)
TURNOVER 0.0005∗∗∗ −0.0005∗∗∗
(0.0001) (0.0002)
PRICE −0.0002∗∗∗ 0.0003∗∗∗
(0.0001) (0.0001)
RETURN 0.0022∗ −0.0090∗∗∗
(0.0013) (0.0020)
BASPREAD −0.0211 0.0599
(0.0524) (0.0855)
AGE 0.0001∗∗ −0.0005∗∗∗
(0.0001) (0.0001)
Q −0.0018∗ 0.0031∗∗
(0.0010) (0.0015)
TANG 0.0024 0.0131
(0.0053) (0.0080)
LEVERAGE −0.0053 0.0198∗∗
(0.0054) (0.0082)
DIV 0.00004 −0.0002
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(0.0002) (0.0003)
ROA −0.0104∗ 0.0135
(0.0055) (0.0090)
SP500 −0.0124∗∗∗ −0.0077∗
(0.0029) (0.0043)
AT 0.0004 0.0047∗
(0.0018) (0.0027)
NANALYSTS −0.0003∗∗ 0.0002
(0.0002) (0.0002)
PE −0.00002∗ 0.00002
(0.00001) (0.00002)
Observations 19,695 15,749
R2 0.3878 0.4516
Adjusted R2 0.3873 0.4510
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Year fixed effects included.
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Table B.5: Textual Similarity of Accounting Policy Disclosures and Firm Perfor-
mance
Regressions of textual similarity of accounting policy disclosures from the “Summary of Significant
Accounting Policies” section, SIM , from firms’ 10-K’s on earnings attributes. ROA denotes earnings
scaled by assets. NEG EARNINGS indicates a negative net income. DEC EARNINGS indi-
cates a decline in net income over the previous period. Data span all non-financial and non-utility stocks
listed on the NYSE, NASDAQ, or American Stock Exchange (AMEX) over the years 1994 to 2015 with
December fiscal-year-ends. Control variables are included. All other variables are defined in Appendix
A.
Dependent variable:
ROAt ROAt+1 NEG EARNINGS DEC EARNINGS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
SIM 0.0047∗ −0.0218 −0.040∗∗∗ −0.093∗∗∗
(0.0024) (0.0146) (0.0066) (0.0076)
RETURN 0.1194∗∗∗ 0.0375 −0.0669∗∗∗ −0.1943∗∗∗
(0.0078) (0.0458) (0.0209) (0.0267)
MVE 0.0273∗∗∗ −0.0700 −0.0846∗∗∗ −0.0110
(0.0068) (0.0445) (0.0202) (0.0204)
AGE 0.0014∗∗∗ 0.0022 −0.0042∗∗∗ 0.0006
(0.0003) (0.0016) (0.0007) (0.0008)
SP500 −0.1096∗∗∗ −0.0071 0.0350 −0.0625
(0.0141) (0.0846) (0.0385) (0.0430)
DIV −0.0016∗∗∗ 0.0003 −0.0003 0.0009
(0.0004) (0.0023) (0.0011) (0.0014)
LEVERAGE −0.1444∗∗∗ −0.0103 −0.0599 −0.1115∗∗
(0.0174) (0.1123) (0.0511) (0.0520)
Q −0.0467∗∗∗ 0.0514∗∗ 0.0273∗∗ −0.0117
(0.0037) (0.0241) (0.0110) (0.0117)
ROA 1.0717∗∗∗ −0.7509∗∗∗ −0.4311∗∗∗
(0.0980) (0.0446) (0.0484)
ASSETS 0.0371∗∗∗ 0.0694 0.0513∗∗ 0.0411∗
(0.0070) (0.0451) (0.0205) (0.0210)
Constant −0.3883∗∗∗ −0.1431 0.6693∗∗∗ 0.3850∗∗∗
(0.0168) (0.1072) (0.0488) (0.0547)
48
Observations 4,076 2,126 2,126 2,110
R2 0.3211 0.0782 0.2729 0.0936
Adjusted R2 0.3196 0.0738 0.2694 0.0892
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Year and firm fixed effects included.
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31
0.
32
3
0.
19
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2
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20
9
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Table B.7: Active and Passive Institutional Ownership, Regression in Levels
OLS results of regressing the ratio of active-to-passive dollars invested (investors), PCT -ACTIV E
(NUM -ACTIV E) on the textual similarity of accounting policy disclosures from the “Summary of
Significant Accounting Policies” section, SIM , from firms’ 10-K’s. Control variables are included. All
other variables are defined in Appendix A.
Dependent variable:
PCT -ACTIV Et+1 NUM -ACTIV Et+1
(1) (2) (3) (4)
CONSTANT 0.2325∗∗∗ 0.2011∗∗∗ 0.0782∗∗∗ 0.0397∗∗∗
(0.0114) (0.0171) (0.0110) (0.0147)
PCT-ACTIVE 0.7563∗∗∗ 0.7806∗∗∗
(0.0128) (0.0155)
NUM-ACTIVE 0.9366∗∗∗ 0.9015∗∗∗
(0.0136) (0.0178)
SIM −0.005∗∗∗ −0.0073∗∗∗ −0.012∗∗∗ −0.007∗∗∗
(0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006)
MVE −0.0062 −0.0041
(0.0047) (0.0042)
PRICE 0.0005∗∗∗ 0.0002∗∗
(0.0001) (0.0001)
TURNOVER 0.0026∗ −0.0008
(0.0013) (0.0012)
AGE 0.0003∗∗ 0.0003∗∗
(0.0001) (0.0001)
BASPREAD 0.1134 −0.1213
(0.1510) (0.1358)
SP500 −0.0153∗∗ −0.0134∗∗
(0.0060) (0.0054)
DIV 0.0008∗∗ −0.0004
(0.0003) (0.0003)
LEVERAGE −0.0397∗∗∗ −0.0294∗∗∗
(0.0120) (0.0108)
Q −0.0011 0.0044∗∗
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(0.0024) (0.0022)
RETURN 0.0121∗∗∗ 0.0205∗∗∗
(0.0035) (0.0031)
ROA −0.0104 −0.0311∗∗
(0.0170) (0.0152)
ASSETS 0.0062 0.0132∗∗∗
(0.0046) (0.0041)
NANALYSTS 0.0030 0.0018
(0.0038) (0.0034)
PE −0.0001∗∗∗ −0.0001
(0.00004) (0.00004)
Observations 32,940 32,387 32,940 32,387
R2 0.5462 0.5637 0.6187 0.6484
Adjusted R2 0.5459 0.5607 0.6185 0.6460
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Year and firm fixed effects included.
Standard errors are clustered at the firm level.
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Table B.8: Active-to-Passive Institutional Ownership Ratio, Regression in
Changes
OLS results of regressing changes in the ratio of active-to-passive dollars invested (investors),
PCT -ACTIV E (NUM -ACTIV E) on the textual similarity of accounting policy disclosures from
the “Summary of Significant Accounting Policies” section, SIM , from firms’ 10-K’s. Control variables
are included. All other variables are defined in Appendix A.
Dependent variable:
∆PCT -ACTIV E ∆NUM -ACTIV E
(1) (2) (3) (4)
CONSTANT 0.0351∗∗∗ 0.0288∗∗∗ 0.0451∗∗∗ 0.0319∗∗∗
(0.0033) (0.0034) (0.0029) (0.0029)
∆SIM −0.0018∗∗∗ −0.005∗∗∗ −0.0030∗∗∗ −0.0013∗∗
(0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0005)
∆MVE 0.0025 0.0319∗∗∗
(0.0063) (0.0053)
∆PRICE 0.0007∗∗∗ 0.0005∗∗∗
(0.0001) (0.0001)
∆TURNOVER 0.0035∗∗∗ 0.0054∗∗∗
(0.0013) (0.0011)
∆BASPREAD −0.4683∗∗∗ −0.4413∗∗∗
(0.1543) (0.1292)
∆DIV 0.0002 0.0001
(0.0001) (0.0001)
∆LEVERAGE 0.0954∗∗∗ 0.0276
(0.0216) (0.0181)
∆Q −0.0021 −0.0052∗∗
(0.0026) (0.0022)
∆RETURN −0.0032 −0.0120∗∗∗
(0.0022) (0.0018)
∆ROA −0.0011 0.0120
(0.0140) (0.0118)
∆ASSETS −0.0067 0.0103
(0.0079) (0.0066)
∆NANALYSTS −0.0010 −0.0007
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(0.0007) (0.0005)
∆PE 0.00002 0.00003∗
(0.00002) (0.00001)
Observations 32,938 32,141 32,938 32,141
R2 0.0027 0.0361 0.0098 0.1154
Adjusted R2 0.0024 0.0302 0.0094 0.1100
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Year and firm fixed effects included.
Standard errors are clustered at the firm level.
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Table B.9: Textual Similarity of Accounting Policy Disclosures Difference-in-
Differences Analyses
Difference-in-Difference estimation of the textual similarity of accounting policy disclosures from the
“Summary of Significant Accounting Policies” section, SIM , around events SOP 97-2 (dfrst and sec-
ond columns) and ASU 2009-13 (third and fourth columns) event years (TREATED observations).
Control variables are included. All other variables are defined in Appendix A.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
CONSTANT 0.4003∗∗∗ 0.4332∗∗∗ 0.4309∗∗∗ 0.4360∗∗∗
(0.0019) (0.0107) (0.0018) (0.0103)
POST*TREATED 0.0256∗∗ 0.069∗∗∗ −0.0232∗∗ −0.0497∗∗∗
(0.0125) (0.0143) (0.0120) (0.0130)
TREATED −0.0123∗∗ −0.0101 −0.0226∗∗∗ −0.0157∗∗
(0.0059) (0.0070) (0.0058) (0.0070)
POST 0.0562∗∗∗ 0.0468∗∗∗ −0.0797∗∗∗ −0.0775∗∗∗
(0.0039) (0.0048) (0.0038) (0.0044)
MVE 0.000000 0.000000
(0.000000) (0.000000)
PRICE −0.00004 0.0001
(0.0001) (0.0001)
TURNOVER −0.0096∗∗∗ −0.0090∗∗∗
(0.0014) (0.0014)
AGE −0.0002∗ −0.0003∗∗
(0.0001) (0.0001)
BASPREAD −0.0084 −0.0442
(0.1405) (0.1366)
SP500 0.0418∗∗∗ 0.0321∗∗∗
(0.0061) (0.0060)
DIV 0.0001 0.0001
(0.0001) (0.0001)
LEVERAGE 0.0339∗∗∗ 0.0343∗∗∗
(0.0100) (0.0097)
Q 0.0030∗ 0.0040∗∗
(0.0017) (0.0017)
RETURN −0.0045 −0.0020
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(0.0033) (0.0032)
ROA 0.0525∗∗∗ 0.0379∗∗
(0.0151) (0.0147)
ASSETS −0.0058∗∗∗ −0.0034∗
(0.0018) (0.0018)
NANALYSTS 0.0028 0.0067∗∗
(0.0035) (0.0034)
PE 0.00005∗∗ 0.00002
(0.00002) (0.00002)
Observations 4,655 3,655 4,655 3,655
R2 0.0468 0.0790 0.0908 0.1292
Adjusted R2 0.0462 0.0747 0.0902 0.1251
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table B.10: Post-match differences in pre-period for DD
This table reports diagnostics of the DD tests of how exogeneous shocks to comparability (SOP 97-2
and ASU 2009-13) afffect the ratio of active-to-passive institutional investor ownership in firms. For the
SOP 97-2 event, the sample begins with all firm-years from 1995 to 2001 with non-missing matching
variables and outcome variables during a six-year window around the event year. For the ASU 2009-13
event, the sample begins with all firm-years from 2008 to 2013 with non-missing matching variables
and outcome variables during a five-year window around the event year. Treatment firms are those likely
to engange in multi-element contracts for software products and services. The benchmark control firms
are found by matching treatment firms to candidate control firms on firm-level variables.
Panel A: SOP 97-2 treatment.
PCT -ACTIV E 0.816 0.818 -0.002 -0.261
NUM -ACTIV E 0.753 0.747 0.006 1.357
COMP 0.472 0.455 0.017 1.241
AGE 7.05 7.26 -0.22 -0.49
ASSETS 4.66 4.68 -0.03 -0.38
BASPREAD 0.00 0.01 -0.00 -0.23
RETURN 0.16 0.16 -0.00 -0.07
DIV 0.28 0.24 0.04 0.50
LEVERAGE 0.08 0.08 -0.00 -0.02
MVE 5.47 5.47 -0.00 -0.07
NANALYSTS 4.63 4.58 0.05 0.18
PE 53.98 37.83 16.15 3.06
PRICE 20.02 19.32 0.70 0.88
Q 3.11 2.97 0.13 1.11
ROA -0.02 -0.05 0.03 2.35
SP500 0.04 0.03 0.01 1.03
TURNOVER 1.91 1.79 0.12 1.34
Panel B: ASU 2009-13 treatment.
Treatment Control Differences t-statistics
PCT -ACTIV E 0.848 0.817 0.031 1.318
NUM -ACTIV E 0.787 0.812 -0.025 -1.508
COMP 0.359 0.398 -0.039 -1.368
AGE 13.20 13.40 -0.20 -0.38
ASSETS 6.07 5.99 0.08 0.90
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Treatment Control Differences t-statistic
BASPREAD 0.00 0.00 -0.00 -1.05
RETURN 0.15 0.15 -0.00 -0.01
DIV 1.72 0.95 0.76 2.34
LEVERAGE 0.10 0.11 -0.02 -2.00
MVE 6.12 6.05 0.07 0.77
NANALYSTS 7.66 6.89 0.77 2.36
PE 20.91 20.84 0.07 0.02
PRICE 14.76 19.48 -4.72 -4.66
Q 1.52 1.63 -0.11 -1.56
ROA -0.02 -0.04 0.01 1.31
SP500 0.08 0.06 0.02 1.57
TURNOVER 2.09 2.19 -0.10 -0.90
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Table B.11: Difference-in-Differences Analysis around SOP 97-3
Difference-in-Difference estimation of the ratio of active-to-passive dollars invested (investors),
PCT -ACTIV E (NUM -ACTIV E) around SOP 97-2 event years (TREATED observations). Con-
trol variables are included. All other variables are defined in Appendix A.
Dependent variable:
PCT -ACTIV Et+1 NUM -ACTIV Et+1
(1) (2) (3) (4)
CONSTANT 0.8131∗∗∗ 0.8341∗∗∗ 0.7416∗∗∗ 0.6538∗∗∗
(0.0047) (0.0122) (0.0036) (0.0088)
POST *TREATED −0.048∗∗ −0.04∗∗ −0.027∗∗∗ −0.05∗∗∗
(0.0290) (0.0189) (0.0069) (0.0065)
TREATED 0.0050 0.0047 0.0138∗∗∗ 0.0126∗∗
(0.0069) (0.0068) (0.0053) (0.0050)
POST −0.0343∗∗∗ −0.0359∗∗∗ −0.0054 −0.0058
(0.0063) (0.0063) (0.0048) (0.0046)
MVE −0.0142∗∗ 0.0255∗∗∗
(0.0064) (0.0046)
PRICE 0.0001 0.0001
(0.0002) (0.0001)
TURNOVER −0.000005 0.0023∗∗∗
(0.0011) (0.0008)
AGE −0.0019∗∗∗ −0.0024∗∗∗
(0.0003) (0.0003)
BASPREAD 0.2447∗ 0.6080∗∗∗
(0.1303) (0.0949)
SP500 −0.0640∗∗∗ −0.0058
(0.0137) (0.0100)
DIV −0.0004 −0.0028∗∗∗
(0.0015) (0.0011)
LEVERAGE −0.0156 −0.0150
(0.0200) (0.0146)
Q 0.0007 −0.0026
(0.0022) (0.0016)
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RETURN 0.0102∗∗∗ −0.0059∗∗∗
(0.0030) (0.0022)
ROA 0.0288∗∗∗ 0.0300∗∗∗
(0.0099) (0.0072)
ASSETS 0.0097 −0.0069
(0.0065) (0.0047)
NANALYSTS 0.0156∗∗∗ −0.0005
(0.0048) (0.0035)
PE 0.000001 0.000004
(0.00002) (0.00002)
Observations 3,402 3,402 3,402 3,402
R2 0.0169 0.0556 0.0064 0.1320
Adjusted R2 0.0160 0.0509 0.0055 0.1277
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table B.12: Difference-in-Differences Analysis around ASU 2009-13
Difference-in-Difference estimation of the ratio of active-to-passive dollars invested (investors),
PCT -ACTIV E (NUM -ACTIV E) around ASU 2009-13 event years (TREATED observations).
Control variables are included. All other variables are defined in Appendix A.
Dependent variable:
PCT -ACTIV Et+1 NUM -ACTIV Et+1
(1) (2) (3) (4)
CONSTANT 0.8656∗∗∗ 0.8881∗∗∗ 0.8186∗∗∗ 0.7341∗∗∗
(0.0032) (0.0097) (0.0022) (0.0063)
POSTS *TREATED 0.0780∗∗∗ 0.0188∗∗∗ 0.0063∗ 0.0058∗
(0.0065) (0.0043) (0.0045) (0.0040)
TREATED 0.0036 0.0054 0.0009 −0.0009
(0.0046) (0.0045) (0.0031) (0.0029)
POST 0.0900∗∗∗ 0.0089∗∗ 0.0035 0.0031
(0.0046) (0.0046) (0.0032) (0.0030)
MVE −0.0047 0.0062∗∗
(0.0042) (0.0027)
PRICE 0.0001 −0.0002∗∗∗
(0.0001) (0.0001)
TURNOVER −0.0020∗∗ 0.0027∗∗∗
(0.0009) (0.0006)
AGE −0.0011∗∗∗ −0.0005∗∗∗
(0.0002) (0.0001)
BASPREAD 0.7238∗∗∗ −0.4499∗∗∗
(0.2394) (0.1552)
SP500 −0.0318∗∗∗ −0.0129∗∗∗
(0.0075) (0.0049)
DIV −0.0003 −0.0014∗∗∗
(0.0003) (0.0002)
LEVERAGE −0.0031 −0.0259∗∗∗
(0.0127) (0.0082)
Q 0.0015 0.0006
(0.0019) (0.0013)
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RETURN 0.0193∗∗∗ −0.0010
(0.0024) (0.0015)
ROA −0.0195∗∗ 0.0203∗∗∗
(0.0094) (0.0061)
ASSETS 0.0042 0.0060∗∗
(0.0042) (0.0027)
NANALYSTS −0.0036 0.0112∗∗∗
(0.0031) (0.0020)
PE 0.00001 0.00001
(0.00002) (0.00001)
Observations 2,550 2,550 2,550 2,550
R2 0.2160 0.2791 0.0774 0.2428
Adjusted R2 0.2151 0.2742 0.0763 0.2378
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table B.13: Earnings Management Difference-in-Differences Analyses
Difference-in-Difference estimation of propensity to just exceed earnings expectations (a proxy for
earnings management) around SOP 97-2 (frst and second columns) and ASU 2009-13 (third and fourth
columns) event years (TREATED observations).
(1) (2) (3) (4)
POST *TREATED −0.0143 −0.0181∗ −0.0078 −0.0135
(0.0104) (0.0103) (0.0134) (0.0131)
TREATED 0.0240∗∗∗ 0.0099∗∗ 0.0225∗∗∗ 0.0083∗
(0.0046) (0.0047) (0.0044) (0.0045)
POST 0.0018 0.0019 −0.0289∗∗∗ −0.0131∗∗
(0.0048) (0.0047) (0.0059) (0.0059)
MVE 0.000001∗∗ 0.000001∗∗
(0.000000) (0.000000)
PRICE −0.0005∗∗∗ −0.0005∗∗∗
(0.0001) (0.0001)
TURNOVER −0.0120∗∗∗ −0.0121∗∗∗
(0.0010) (0.0010)
AGE −0.0002∗ −0.0002∗
(0.0001) (0.0001)
BASPREAD −0.3521∗∗∗ −0.3578∗∗∗
(0.1176) (0.1176)
SP500 0.0232∗∗∗ 0.0212∗∗∗
(0.0056) (0.0056)
DIV −0.0003 −0.0003
(0.0003) (0.0003)
LEVERAGE −0.0346∗∗∗ −0.0358∗∗∗
(0.0094) (0.0094)
Q 0.0225∗∗∗ 0.0224∗∗∗
(0.0013) (0.0013)
RETURN 0.0083∗∗∗ 0.0086∗∗∗
(0.0027) (0.0027)
ROA 0.1897∗∗∗ 0.1902∗∗∗
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(0.0105) (0.0105)
AT −0.0049∗∗∗ −0.0045∗∗∗
(0.0016) (0.0016)
NANALYSTS 0.0010 0.0014
(0.0028) (0.0028)
PE 0.0006∗∗∗ 0.0006∗∗∗
(0.00002) (0.00002)
Constant 0.1180∗∗∗ 0.1283∗∗∗ 0.1209∗∗∗ 0.1272∗∗∗
(0.0018) (0.0084) (0.0018) (0.0084)
Observations 44,595 44,266 44,595 44,266
R2 0.0006 0.0514 0.0013 0.0516
Adjusted R2 0.0006 0.0511 0.0013 0.0512
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table B.14: Voluntary Disclosure Difference-in-Differences Analyses
Difference-in-Difference estimation of management forecasts (a proxy for voluntary disclosure) around
SOP 97-2 (frst and second columns) and ASU 2009-13 (third and fourth columns) event years
(TREATED observations).
(1) (2) (3) (4)
POST *TREATED 0.4340∗∗∗ 0.2515∗ −0.1199 −0.0799
(0.1456) (0.1426) (0.2675) (0.2545)
TREATED −0.6466∗∗∗ −0.3292∗∗∗ −0.5570∗∗∗ −0.2342∗∗∗
(0.0651) (0.0670) (0.0619) (0.0644)
POST −2.3951∗∗∗ −1.9278∗∗∗ −0.4963∗∗∗ −1.2334∗∗∗
(0.0676) (0.0671) (0.1235) (0.1200)
MVE 0.000004 0.000001
(0.00001) (0.00001)
PRICE 0.0046∗∗ 0.0055∗∗∗
(0.0018) (0.0019)
TURNOVER 0.0308∗∗∗ 0.0409∗∗∗
(0.0034) (0.0035)
AGE 0.0097∗∗∗ 0.0150∗∗∗
(0.0019) (0.0019)
BASPREAD −2.3846 −3.1523
(2.3728) (2.4224)
SP500 −0.2885∗∗∗ −0.4761∗∗∗
(0.0847) (0.0864)
DIV 0.0015 0.0030
(0.0065) (0.0066)
LEVERAGE −1.0602∗∗∗ −1.6006∗∗∗
(0.1429) (0.1451)
Q −0.0007 −0.0480∗∗
(0.0234) (0.0239)
RETURN 0.0492 0.0941∗∗
(0.0434) (0.0443)
ROA 1.6958∗∗∗ 2.1996∗∗∗
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(0.1769) (0.1791)
AT 0.3979∗∗∗ 0.4501∗∗∗
(0.0281) (0.0287)
NANALYSTS 0.2527∗∗∗ 0.2795∗∗∗
(0.0349) (0.0357)
PE −0.0024∗∗∗ −0.0029∗∗∗
(0.0005) (0.0005)
Constant 4.5808∗∗∗ 0.9701∗∗∗ 4.1311∗∗∗ 0.2570
(0.0301) (0.1572) (0.0287) (0.1587)
Observations 20,710 20,075 20,710 20,075
R2 0.0709 0.1528 0.0053 0.1169
Adjusted R2 0.0708 0.1521 0.0052 0.1162
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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